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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
MURRAY CITY, a Municipal
Corporation of the
State of Utah,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF
MURRAY CITY SCHOOL
DISTRICT, a Municipal
Corporation of the
State of Utah,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
10060

RE SPONDENT'S BRIEF
1

STATEMENT OF 'THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action to recover delinquent sewer
charges. The Defendant counterclaimed seeking a
declaratory judgment that it was exempt from the
payment of the charges.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried on a stipul,ation of facts and
judgment rendered for the Plaintiff for charges
to September 30, 1963 in the sum of $8,593.25.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal and a judgment stat1
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ing the School District is exempt from payment of
sewer service charges.
ST~TE'ME~NT

OF FACTS
The Plainiff is a municipal corporation and a
second class city owning and operating a sewer
system within its corporate limits. Defendant is a
body ~orporate with its boundaries coinciding with
those of the Plaintiff. Prior to September, 19'52,
the Plaintiff's sewer system served only approxim~ately one-third of the city's homes and businesses.
Plaintiff had no treatment plant, but treated the
sewage in city owned septic tanks. On September
5, 1'952, the electors of the city at a special election
authorized the issuance of $1,300,000 of water and
sewer revenue bonds to provide for the construction
of extensions and improvements to the city's water
plant and sewer system. The sewer system was
thereafter greatly expanded to serve most of the
city's dwellings and commercial buildings, and a
sewage treatment plant was constructed to treat
sewage collected from the en tire system.
Mter the system was extended, persons making
connections thereto were charged 1a connection fee
in accordance with a schedule adopted by city ordinance (See Section 3 of the attached copy of Ordinance 56 as amended for the connection fees being
currently charged). Persons who were already connected to the system paid no such fee, but new and
old ·connectors 1alike were and are presently required
to pay a monthly service charge, the current rates
1
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being shown in Section 2 of the attached copy of
Ordinance 56 as amended. Defendant now has 10
~chool buildings and one administrative building
connected to the Plaintiff's sewer system. 'The Defendant paid the monthly service charge of five
cents per child until the Attorney General of Utah
in an opinion issued on or about November 8, 1'960,
rules that the State of Utah was not obligated to
pay fees for connection of a State owned building
to a municipal sewer sys tern. Upon the authority
of that opinion the Defendant refused to pay for
the service charges and connection fees, and the
Plaintiff brought suit to recover all delinquent
charges.
The service charges and connection fees collected by the Plaintiff are placed in a separate fund
and used for the payment of opei'Iation and maintenance costs and the payment of principal and interest falling due on the revenue bonds issued to
Lnance construction of the extension to the system
in ln52. The balance remaining after the payment
of those costs has been used in recent years to help
finance capital in1provements to the system, including expansion of the capacity of the treatment plant.
Howevel', in some former years the balance in the
fund at the end of the year was transferred to the
general fund of the city.
A copy of the Plaintiff's ordinance authorizing issuance of revenue bonds to defray the costs of
extending the city's sewer and water system is at3
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ached and made part of this statement of facts.
Also, the pleadings of the parties hereto are incorporated herein and made part of this statement of
facts.
ARGUME'N'T
POINT I.
SE WER CONNECTION AND SERVICE CHARGES
.NRE CO'M'MERCIA'L CONTRACTED CHARGES AND
ARE THE SAME AS A!NY OTHER CONTRACTED
CHARGE AND ARE NOT "TAXES" OR "ASSE'SSMEN'M" FROM WHICH A SCHOOL DISTRI CT IS EXEMPT FROM PAYING UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
OR STATUTES OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
1

1

1

:The office of the Attorney General A. Pratt
Kesler and his assistants, Roland G. Robinson Jr.
and Ronald N. Boyce under date of Mrarch 12, 196'2
in an opinion numbered #62-021 researched this
question most thoroughly. The question as to whether
these charges were "taxes" or "assessments" and
whether the School District was exempt from payment of the same by construction of the Statutes of
the State of Utah 1and its Constitution and existing
cases were carefully considered. We shall quote extensively later on from that opinion inasmuch as
it develops our position step by step. The opinion
discusses ·2 previous opinions of the Attorney General's office and why they were in error in holding
for the position espoused by the Defendant Appellant.
Defendant suggests that since both parties 'are
tax supported with co-existing boundaries, no taxpayer will suffer any detriment if the School Dis4
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trict is exempt from payment of the service. Even
if that were so, these facts will not apply except in
this case because there are many cases where the
boundaries are varied. The question should be held
strictly to the liability to pay the charge. Such an
accounting fiction as Defendants request would render it impossible to truly determine the costs of
rarious governmental or ·taxing units. With the
healthy bite school districts are taking from the tax
apple, undoubtedly they or anyone similarly situated would like to shift some expenses elsewhere.
Also, why not say they should be exempt from paying charges for lights, 'heat, supplies, etc. The source
providing the service is not the important question,
it is whether or not it is a cont:r"~actual arrangement
the same as any other purchases by the School District.
If a School District was not required to pay for
lights, gas, water, sewer or other services, those
municipalities, persons, or corporations providing
the same would surely see that they were not made
a\·ailable unless they were to be compensated as fron1
other recipients. Can we require services to be provided gratuitiously without taking property (value)
from one and giving it to another? Supposing private
capital provided these services, could we require
gratuitous services for the School District?
Now, let us proceed with the opinion of the
rtah Attorney General #62-0211 .
.. The question presented is whether a school
5
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district may be held to pay for the 1actual cost of connecting to a sewer line of a sewer district, and
whether it may be charged for the services that are
provided. Article XIII, Section ·2, of the Utah Constitution provides:
'~The property of the state, counties, cities,
towns, school districts, municipal corporations
~and public libraries * * * shall be exempt from
taxation.''
Section 5·9-2-1, U. C.A. 1953, also provides :
"The propertiy of the United States, of this
state, counties, cities, towns, school districts,
municipal corporations * * * shall be exempt
from taxation."
It appears clear, therefore, that the property
of schodl districts is not subject to tax. In ~addition,
Section 153-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, provides that school
board property is exempt from special assessment.
The matter thus resolves itself into a question of
whether the payment of connection fees and sewer
service charges are taxes or special assessment. If
they 1are, they may not be assessed against the school
districts; if they are not, the school district can be
compelled to pay:
1. Two opinions previously issued by the office of the Attorney General have held that such
charges are taxes and hence cannot be imposed.
(Nos. 60-07'2 and 60-029.)
The only per tin en t case cited in these opinions
is the case of Sbate ex rel, Board of Education of
Salt Lake City v. McGonagle, 38 Utah 277, 112 Pac.
6
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401 (1910) cited in No. 60-072. In this case, the
Board of Education brought a mandamus action
against the Salt Lake City Engineer to compel him
to allow the Board to connect a school building with
a city sewer. The City Engineer had refused to issue
the permit until the City paid a special assessment
levied against the school property for the construction of the sewer. In this case, the. School Board
tendered the connection or permit fee ; 38 ·U tab 2'77
at 278, the Court said:
"We think it equally clear that the lands owned by the Board are exempt from local assessment or special taxation for the construction
of a public sewer * * *"
The basis of the court's opinion was that this
constituted a tax. The decision was based on a similar holding of the court in W ey vs. Salt Lake City,
35 Utah 504, 101 Pac. 381, holding assessments for
street improvements to "be invalid. Both of the decisions relied upon Comp. Laws of Utah, 1907, Sec.
l~);i:~. which is the same as Section 5'3-4-12, U.C.A.
195:i, which provides.:
"All property real and personal held by any
board of education shall be exempt from general and special taxation, and from al'l local
asessments for any purpose, and no such property shall be taken in any manner for debts."
Thus, the cases were concerned with a particular statute exempting the property of school districts from special or general taxation, but not with
the question of connection fees per se, since in the
7
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case before the court the fee was tendered, However,
as to connection charges it was said:
"It, however, is urged, that though the property was exempt and the assessment invalid
still, the city being the owner of the sewer,
could lawfully impose the payment of areasona:ble charge before it was required to permit the board to connect with or use the sewer
and that the payment of ninety-eight dollars,
the amount of the assessment by the board
for the use of this sewer was a reasonable
charge. The legislature has seen fit to exempt
all property of the board, both real and personal, from special taxation and all local assessments, for any purpose. Since the property
was not subject to the assessment, and the
levy for that reason invalid and the assessment unenforceable, to then permit the municipality to impose as a condition of tapping
and making a connection with the public sewer
the payment of a charge for the use of the
sewer, is to allow the municipality to do indirec~ly what it cannot do directly. (State
ex rei. Dunner vs. Graydon, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct.
R. 6'34, Meyler vs. Meadville, 23 Pa. Co. Ct.
R. 1'19.)

The case is not clear as to whether the court
was in effect saying you cannot disguise a tax as
a connection charge, or whether it was saying that
the charges of any kind could not be imposed. It is
certain that the opinion did not deal with day-today reasonable service charges necessitated by the
connection. It appears more suggestive from the
language of the court that it was an ~attempt to do
"indirectly what could not be done directly," that
8
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the court was concerned with fraud or sham and
not actual related expenses. The briefs filed in the
case have apparently been lost, nor are copies of
the two decisions relied upon by the Supreme Court
available in the State Law Library. It seems more
likely, however, that the decision only purported to
cover taxation.
2. The Utah Supreme Court recently decided
in State vs. Salt Lake City Public Board of Eduo,ation, Case No. 9492, January ·5, 1962, that the state
must pay compen'Sation for taking of school board
property for highway use. Analogous to that case
is the situation of sewer and water districts, since
if a school board were allowed to compel connection
with a sewer line and use its capacity or require an
expanded capacity, it would in effect be 'sanctioning
the taking of the property or money of a sewer district without compensation therefor.
3. It is submitted that the Utah Supreme
Court has not directly decided the question of whether the actual costs of connection and a reasonable
service charge, directly related to the 1actual expenses
incurred in providing the sewer facility, may be
charged by a sewer district against a school district.
Section 17-6-3.8, U.C.A. 1953, provides:
"'Vithout in any way limiting the powers
hereinabove reposed in districts created under
this act, it is expressly provided that each such
district shall have:
* * *
(c) The power to enter in to such con tracts
9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as are considered desirable by the board to
carry out the functions of the district, including specifically the power to enter into contracts with municipal corporations, or other
public corporations, or district, and any county municipal corporation, or any other public
corporation or districts, shall have the power
to enter into contracts with districts created
under this act for the purpose of constructing,
acquiring or operating all or any part of a
system for the collection, treatment tand disposition of sewage. * * *
(d) The power to impose and collect charges
for water or other services or facilities afforded by the district to its consumer's and to
pledge all or any part of the revenues so derived to the payment of any bonds of the district. * * *
It would appear that the Le'gisiature intended
that water and sewer districts be allowed to enter
into contracts with public districts ('school districts)
and to charge for their actual services. If so, the
Legislature could hardly have intended Section
53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, to have racted as a cloak of
immunity since it would be inconsistent with what
is expressed and implied by Section 17-6-3.8, U.C.A.
1953. 'Therefore, it may be said that the legislative
in tent was to allow reasonable service charges to
defray actual expenses.
As noted before, no judici1al decision by the
Utah Court has been rendered on this exact problem; the McGonagle case notwithstanding. In addition, the McGonagle case was decided before Sec10
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tion 17-3-3.8, U. C.A. 1953, was ena:cted. Laws of
Utah, 1953, Ch. 28, Sec. 2.
It is further submitted that the great weight
of legal authority is against the proposition urged
by the previous Attorney Generals' opinions. The
general rule is noted in 64 C.J.S., Municipal Corporations, Sec. 1805, p. 273:
"A charge for the use of or connection with
a sewer system has been held a charge for
special benefits received, or a method of paying for the construction. Such a charge, or a
charge for sewer services, or a rental charge
is under most authorities not a 'tax or an assessment.''
Thus, if this is a correct statement of law, Section 53-4-12, U.C.A. 1953, offers no objection to
the charge of a reasonable rental. Other authorities
are in accord. In 9 Comp. Gen. 41 (1929), the Comptroller General of the United States ruled that the
City of Portland could charge the United States
for the privilege of a VA Hospital connecting on to
a city sewer system, and ruled that the same was
not a tax. It was said:
"The amount charged to the Government for
the priYilege of connecting with the city sewer
cannot be said under the above definition
(citing 123 U.S., 288) to have been in the
nature of a tax.''
The same rullng resulted concerning the right
of the U.S. Indian Agency to connect to the City of
Albuquerque; 29 Comp. Gen. 120 (1949). Subse11
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quently, in 31 Comp. Gen. 405, 408 ( 1'952), it was
stated:
"It has been held that the Constitutional immunity of the FedeDal government from state
and local taxation does not extend to payment
of charges for water or sewer services where
the amount thereof is determined pursuant to
statute by the quantity of water furnished or
the amount of sewage disposed of, such
charges being neither regarded as taxes or
assessments, but as the price of the product or
service rendered.''
This is also in ~accord with the general statement
found in 64 C.J.S., Municipa:l Corporations, Sec.
1'805, p. 273, where it is said:
"A distinction has been made between the actual use of the facilities with knowledge of
the rates charged, in which case the charges
are not taxes, or a substitute for taxes, and
not an exercise of the taxing power, but an
obligation resting on contract, and the imposition of a charge with no regard to the extent
or value of the use made of the sewer facilities or whether any use is m~ade, in which case
the charge is in legal effect a tax, the obligation to pay it being created only by the exercise of the taxing power.''
The cases from the great majority of jurisdiction support this conclusion. Thus, in Schmidt vs.
Village of Kimberly, 256 P. 2d 515 (Ida. 1953),
it was said:
"The charges made for water and sewer service are not taxes."
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Opi12
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nion of Justices, 39 A 2d 765 (1944) said:
"In accordance with the weight of authority,
we hold that sewer rents imposed by the City
of Concord are neither taxes nor 1assessments
for a local benefit hut, like water rates are
charges made for a service rendered-charges
which the consumer, by accepting the service,
impliedly agrees to pay."
The Court further said:
"This rule is not restricted to priv:ate consumers but extends unquestionable to the State
where the officials who accept the service
have the power to act in the matter."
See also Town of Port Orchard vs. Kitsop County, 141 P. '2d 151, '(Wash. 1943), (im·plied power
to require county to pay "reasonable fee") .
In Grim vs. Village of Lewisville, 54 Ohio App.
270, & N.E. 2d 998, it was held that such sewer
charges were not "special assessments".
The same result was recognized in Louisville
l's. Joseph Seagrams & S., 307 Ky. 413, 2t1 S.W.
2d 122 ( 1948) . The court said:
.. All of the authorities agree that special
charges of this kind are not taxes, but rents
for the use of sewers, or in some instances but
a method of paying for their construction."
(Citing authority).
In Louisville vs. Barker, County Judge, 307 Ky.
()35, 21:2 S.\V. 2d 122, (1948), the Kentucky Court
of Appeals, in construing a statute similar to Section 17-6-3.8, U.C.A. 1953, as against a claim of
immunity by the county, said:
13
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uThe scope of the power del ega ted by the
Legislature to the District in this particular
is ,a;ll embraeing. It is authorized not only
to fix or establish a schedule of rates and
charges, but to collect them 'from at! the real
property served by the facilities.' KRS,
76.090 ( 1). ·There is no exemption or exclusion of any property of the county. To say
that the county's pToperty is excluded we
would have to read into the statute something
that the LegisLature did not put into it. As
we have pointed out, sewer rental charges
are not taxes or special assessments, 'but possess commercial characteristics. Therefore,
there is no apparent reason to construe the
completely comprehensive language as not
meaning just what it says, under general conceptions of a lack of_ power of one governmental agency to impose burdens on another
in the absence of a positively expressed right."
See also; Sanitation District No. 1 of Jefferson
County vs. Oampbell, 249 S.W. 2d 767 (19'52 Ky.);
~asil vs. Louisville, .et al, 303 Ky. 248, 197 S.W.
2d 41'3 (T946). In State vs. Taylor, _79 N.E. 2d 127 ( 1948),
the Ohio Supreme Court said:
"This case does not present a situation where
the city is endeavoring to tax property belonging to the State of Ohio, since it is well
established that charges for sewer services,
or so-cal'led rental charges are neither taxes
nor assessments."
Other cases would merely make excessive the
length of the memorandum, but several other cases
14
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have followed the a:bove precedents. See: Repperge·r
vs. City of Grand Rapids, 3'38 Mich. 682, 62 N.W.
2d 585 ( 1'954) , (Sewer charges not a tax) ; Oliver
1'.~. Water Works and Sanitary Sewer Board, 73 So.
2d 552 ( 1954, Ala.) ; In Re Philadelphia, 340 Pa.
17, 16 A.2d 32 (1940); Patterson vs. City of Chattan()oga, 241 S.W. 2d 291 (Tenn., 1951); Waterworks
and Sanitary Bd. vs. D.ean, 69 So. 2d 704 (1954,
Ala.); Laverents vs. Cheyenne, 217 P.2d 87 7 (1950,
\Vyo.) ; Michelsen vs. City of Grand Island, 4'8 N.W.
2d 769 (1951).
1

1

4. The only important opinion of the Attorney
General is No. 60-072, since it is the only opinion
purporting to concern itself with the exact problem.
The error in this opinion is first, it fails to consider
the effect of Section 17-6-3.8, U.C.A. 1953, or
whether that statute has overruled the McGonagle
case; second, it assumes that connection fees are
assessments based on the McGonagle language
which is not directly pertinent; and third, the opinion does not consider whether day to day service
charges or reasonable rentals may be charged, nor
does the McGonagle case.

It is the opinion of this office, for the reasons
here set forth, that payment of both reasonable
connection fees and reasonable ren ta'l and service
charges for sewer service may be required of school
distl'icts."
15
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CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing authorities and analysis of the f~acts and the relationship between the
parties it is the Respondent's contention that the
Defendant's should be required to pay for sewer
services the same as if it were any other utility or
contractual relationship between strangers. Surely
the law adequately provides for the raising of revenues to supply school districts and it is not necessary
that they rely on enforced charitable contributions
whether from another tax supported body or from
any individual or corporation.
Respectfully sub1ni tted,
DANSIE, ELLETT AND
HAMMILL
5085 South State Street
Murray, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Respondent
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